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Resolving Choice-of-Law Problems Through
Interest Analysis in Personal Injury Actions: A
Suggested Order of Priority Among Competing
State Interests and Among Available Techniques
for Weighing Those Interests
David E. Seidelson*
To a court committed to resolving choice-of-law problems by the
application of interest analysis, either exclusively or in conjunction
with other approaches,' fashioning an order of priority may be an
extremely important element in the process of deciding which
state's local law to apply. Such an order of priority can come into
play in two different ways. First, if the court is confronted with a
*

Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law, George Washington University.

1. Some courts may rely exclusively on interest analysis and others may utilize this
methodology in conjunction with another approach, frequently that of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflicts. The Restatement approach incorporates interest analysis, territoriality, and mechanical conflicts rules. For a comparison of interest analysis and the Restatement approach, see David E. Seidelson, Interest Analysis or the Restatement Second of
Conflicts: Which Is the PreferableApproach to Resolving Choice-of-Law Problems? 27 Duquesne L Rev 73 (1988). Among those jurisdictions that apparently rely exclusively on interest analysis in tort actions are California, the District of Columbia, Louisiana, New Jersey,
New York, and Oregon. Gregory E. Smith, Choice of Law in the United States, 38 Hastings
L J 1041, 1172-73 (appendix) (1987). Compare Barkanic v General Admin. of CAAC, 923
F2d 957, 958, 963 (2d Cir 1991), in which the court concluded that the New York Court of
Appeals "would now apply the Neumeier [v Kuehner, 31 NY2d 121, 286 NE2d 454 (1972),]
rules to all post-accident loss distribution rules, including rules that limit damages in
wrongful death cases." Among those that apparently utilize the Restatement (Second) approach in tort actions are Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Washington. Smith 38
Hastings L J at 1172-73 (appendix) (cited within this note). Compare Bushkin Assocs., Inc.
v Raytheon Co., 393 Mass 622, 473 NE2d 662, 668 (1985), in which the court decided, in
contract actions, "as with our tort cases, . . . not to tie Massachusetts conflicts law to any
specific choice-of-law doctrine, but [to] seek instead a functional choice-of-law approach
that responds to the interests of the parties, the States involved, and the interstate system
as a whole." For critical comment on Bushkin, see Seidelson, 27 Duquesne L Rev at 103
(cited within this note). Among the latter group, some states emphasize the interest analysis
aspects of the Restatement approach. See, for example, O'Connor v O'Connor, 201 Conn
632, 519 A2d 13 (1986); Johnson v Spider Staging Corp., 87 Wash 2d 577, 555 P2d 997
(1976). Pennsylvania apparently has elected to "follow[] a flexible conflicts methodology
combining interest analysis and the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts." Guy v Liederbach,
501 Pa 47, 459 A2d 744, 748 n 5 (1983).
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true conflict, that is, a case in which each of two states has a significant interest in the application of its own local law, the court must
decide which state's interest in the application of its law is the
more significant. That necessarily compels the court to determine
which of two competing underlying reasons is the more significant.
For example, if the reason underlying State A's law is conduct regulation and the reason underlying State B's law is the protection of
economic integrity, the court will be required to determine which
of those underlying reasons represents the more significant interest. Thus, establishing an order of priority as between a state's interest in conduct regulation and a state's interest in protecting economic integrity may be of enormous assistance in deciding which
state's interest in the application of its law is the more significant.
Second, in attempting to determine which state's interest in the
application of its law is the more significant, the court, through
interest analysis, may have available several different techniques.
For example, the court could engage in a form of comparative impaiiment 2 or the court could inquire as to which state's law
manifests the more sharply focused concern.3 Determining which
of those techniques should have priority over the other may influence the manner in which the court resolves the choice-of-law
problem. Consequently, establishing an order of priority as among
underlying reasons and among available techniques could facilitate
the judicial task significantly. It is my intention to attempt to establish an order of priority among those underlying reasons and
among those available techniques most likely to arise in choice-oflaw problems in personal injury actions.
Let's fashion a hypothetical case that will begin to create such
4
an order of priority. Plaintiff brings a product liability action
2.

Comparative impairment is the technique used by the California court after in-

terest analysis has demonstrated a true conflict. See, for example, Bernard v Hurrah's Club,
16 Cal 3d 313, 546 P2d 719 (1976), Offshore Rental Co. v ContinentalOil Co., 22 Cal 3d 157,
583 P2d 721 (1978); Hall v University of Nev., 74 Cal App 3d 280, 141 Cal Rptr 439 (1977),
aff'd on constitutional grounds sub nom, Nevada v Hall, 440 US 410 (1979); Lettieri v Equitable Life Assurance Society, 627 F2d 930 (9th Cir 1980).
3. The Brazilian limitation [on recovery] in terms applies only to airplane accidents, unlike the Massachusetts provision rejected in Kilberg, which was an acrossthe-board ceiling on recovery for wrongful death in that state. The focus of Brazilian
concern could hardly be clearer.
Tramontana v S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense [Varig Airlines], 350 F2d
468, 471 (DC Cir 1965).
4. For an examination of a series of choice-of-law problems likely to arise in product
liability actions, see David E. Seidelson, The Choice-of-Law Process in Product Liability
Actions, 26 Duquesne L Rev 559 (1988).
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against the defendant based on Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts,5 asserting that plaintiff was injured while using
defendant's defective and unreasonably dangerous product. The
defendant attempts to reduce the amount of damages potentially
recoverable by alleging that plaintiff was comparatively negligent
in the manner in which he utilized the product. The plaintiff is
domiciled in State A; defendant is domiciled in State B. Both
states have adopted Section 402A as a part of their common law
and both states have pure comparative negligence statutes.6 State
A, however, holds that comparative negligence is not applicable to
402A actions.7 Under State A's local law, the plaintiff, even if negligent in his use of the product, is entitled to recover full damages
from the seller of the defective, unreasonably dangerous product.
State B, on the other hand, permits the 402A defendant to utilize
comparative negligence to reduce the amount of damages recoverable." The action is brought in State A. In response to defendant's
assertion of comparative negligence, predicated on State B's local
law, plaintiff moves to strike that partial defense, asserting that
State A's local law should be applied. How should the court rule on
plaintiff's motion?
If the court utilizes interest analysis, it will attempt to identify
the reasons underlying each state's local law. State A precludes the
402A defendant from asserting comparative impairment for two
reasons: (1) to deter the sale of defective products by making the
seller feel an undiluted sting of liability,9 and (2) to assure that the
5. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
6. For a discussion of pure comparative negligence. statutes and modified comparative negligence statutes, see W. Page Keeton, ed, Prosser and Keeton on Torts 471-75
(West, 5th ed 1984).
7. See, for example, Staymates v ITT Holub Indus., 364 Pa Super 37, 527 A2d 140

(1987).
8. See, for example, Duncan v Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 SW2d 414 (Tex 1984).
The highest courts of seventeen states and one territory have [applied comparative
negligence principles to strict products liability], while nine state legislatures have
enacted statutes which make comparative negligence principles applicable to strict
products liability. For a listing of these jurisdictions and the case citings see Comment, Comparative Negligence and Strict Products Liability: Where Do We Stand?
Where Do We Go?, 29 Vill L Rev 695 (1984).
Staymates, 527 A2d at 145 n 5.
9. The effect of reducing a plaintiff's recovery by the amount of his fault, the
argument goes, will be to reduce or remove the manufacturer's incentive to produce
safe products.
Lewis v Timco, Inc., 716 F2d 1425, 1429 (5th Cir 1983) (maritime case, rejecting the
argument).
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injured victim does not become an indigent ward of the state. 10
The first reason, aimed at conduct regulation, would convert into a
significant interest on the part of State A in having its law applied
if the conduct intended to be regulated or the immediate consequences of that conduct occurred in State A or if the ongoing consequences of that conduct would be felt in State A.11 Even if the
manufacture and sale of the defective product occurred in State B,
State A would have an interest in the application of its law if the
product injured the plaintiff in State A because the injury would
be the immediate consequence of the sale of the defective product.
Similarly, even if the injury occurred in State B, State A would
have an interest in the application of its law if the ongoing consequences of the conduct would be felt in State A, as they would,
given the plaintiff's domicile in that state.
Let's assume that sale and injury occurred in State B but the
ongoing consequences will be felt in State A, the plaintiff's domicile. In these circumstances, the conduct-regulating reason underlying State A's law would convert into a significant interest on the
part of State A in having its law preclude the defendant from invoking comparative negligence applied to this case. Because the
plaintiff is domiciled in State A, the second reason for that state's
law also would convert into a significant interest on the part of
State A in having its law applied: if plaintiff's damages are diminished through comparative negligence, the injured plaintiff may
become an indigent ward of State A. Consequently, both of the
reasons underlying State A's law convert into significant interests
10. It was the belief of the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts that the
burden of accidental injuries caused by products placed in the stream of commerce be
shouldered by those "who market the products", and the cost of such injuries "be
treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance can be obtained
. " Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, Comment c.
Staymates, 527 A2d at 143.
11. When one reason for a state's law is conduct regulation, I believe that reason
converts into a significant interest on the part of that state in the application of its
law if: (1) the conduct occurred in that state, or (2) the immediate consequences of
that conduct occurred in that state, or (3) the continuing consequences of that conduct will be felt in that state. Presumably, a state's interest in regulating conduct
rests on a desire to avoid the immediate or continuing adverse consequences made
possible by such conduct. Consequently, if the conduct occurs within the state,
thereby generating its reasonably foreseeable consequences within the state, or the
immediate consequences occur within the state, or the continuing consequences will
be felt within the state, the state's interest in conduct regulation converts into a significant interest.
David E. Seidelson, Interest Analysis: The Quest for Perfection and the Frailtiesof Man,
19 Duquesne L Rev 207, 239 (1981).
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on the part of State A in having its law applied.
State B's local law permitting the 402A defendant to diminish
damages through comparative negligence exists to: (1) protect the
economic integrity of State B sellers by assuring a more equitable
distribution of the economic loss resulting from the negligent use
of defective products,1 2 and (2) encourage product users to exercise
reasonable care.1 3 Because the defendant is a State B seller, it falls
precisely within the class intended to be protected by the first reason for that state's law; thus, that reason converts into a significant
interest on the part of State B in having its law applied. Since the
plaintiff's injury-producing product use occurred in State B, the
second reason for that state's law, conduct regulation, also converts
into a significant interest on the part of State B in having its law
applied: the conduct intended to be regulated and the immediate
consequences of that conduct occurred in State B.
Interest analysis indicates that the case presents a true conflict:
each state has a significant interest in the application of its own
local law. In these circumstances, the court, under Allstate Insur12. A system of strict liability with comparative fault includes in the manufacturer's share of the accident costs only those costs caused by product defects. In that
case the manufacturer will have the correct economic incentive to adjust the design of
the product to minimize accident costs caused by the design. A system of product
liability with no comparative fault would add to the manufacturer's share those accident costs caused by negligent use and not by any product defect. This increase in
the manufacturer's share would result in an increased, and therefore inefficient, level
of expenditures on preventive measures.
Lewis, 716 F2d at 1432.
13. In Bell v Jet Wheel Blast, 462 So2d 166 (La 1985), the Louisiana Supreme
Court set forth the relevant test to determine when the plaintiff's fault reduces the
plaintiff's net recovery in a products liability case. A court should reduce a strict
liability judgment as a result of the plaintiff's fault when the consequent reduction of
the award will realistically promote user care without drastically reducing the manufacturer's incentive to make a safer product ....
The focus, therefore, is on the effect, if any, the reduction of the award for the plaintiff's comparative negligence will have on user care . ...
Because [the plaintiff's] injury was directly related to his failure to follow established
procedures, reduction of his award for his own fault should encourage user care.
Davis v Commercial Union Ins. Co., 892 F2d 378, 382-83 (5th Cir 1990).
The user will intentionally alter his use of the product only if his perceived cost of
altering his use to avoid an accident is less than his expected cost from an accident
resulting from his failure to alter his behavior. The inclusion of comparative fault will
affect user behavior in a manner that results in a more efficient utilization of resources. Under simple strict liability, as proposed by the plaintiff, the user has no
economic incentive to avoid an accident that he could avoid more cheaply than the
manufacturer.
Lewis, 716 F2d at 1432.
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ance Co. v. Hague,'14 would be constitutionally free to apply the
law of either state. Neither result would violate the due process 15
rights of the litigant adversely affected thereby and application of
the forum's law would not violate the Full Faith and Credit
Clause."6 The forum, however, committed to utilizing interest analysis, will attempt to determine which state's interest in the application of its own law is the more significant and apply the local law
of that state.
This final step of interest analysis in this case is somewhat demanding. Not only does the case present a true conflict, it confronts the court with rather evenly balanced competing interests.
State A has a significant interest in the application of its law precluding the use of comparative negligence based on that state's desire to: (1) assure that its domiciled victim does not become an
indigent ward of that state, and (2) deter the sale of defective
products by having the seller feel an undiluted sting of liability.
State B has a significant interest in the application of its law permitting the utilization of comparative negligence based on its desire to: (1) protect the economic integrity of its domiciled seller,
and (2) deter negligent product use by having the user suffer a diminished recovery. Each state has an interest in protecting the economic integrity of its domiciled litigant and each state has an interest in conduct regulation. How should the court go about
determining which state's interest in the application of its own law
is the more significant?
Let's begin by weighing each state's interest in protecting the
economic integrity of its domiciled litigant. State A wants to assure
that the injured victim does not become an indigent ward and
State B wants to assure that the seller does not become bankrupt.
Which of these competing economic interests is the more significant? I believe that the court should conclude that State A's interest is the more significant. Why? Given an adverse choice-of-law
result, the indigence of the injured victim, deprived of his pre-existing capacity to be entirely self-supporting, seems more likely to
eventuate than does the bankruptcy of the seller, which retains its
commercial capacity to pass on the cost of the undiminished liability. Consequently, looking only at the competing economic interests, State A seems to have the more significant interest in the ap14.
15.
16.

449 US 302 (1981).
US Const, Amend XIV, § 1.
US Const, Art IV, § 1.
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plication of its local law.
But how about each state's interest in conduct regulation? State
A wishes to impose on the seller an undiminished sting of liability
for the purpose of deterring the marketing of defective products.
State B wishes to reduce the plaintiff's recovery for the purpose of
deterring the negligent use of products. Each state has a significant
interest in conduct regulation and each state's interest in conduct
regulation is aimed at protecting and preserving human life.
Merely to assert each state's interest in conduct regulation in those
terms, protecting and preserving human life, suggests strongly that
such a conduct regulating purpose is of greater moment than each
state's admittedly legitimate interest in protecting the economic
integrity of its domiciled litigant. Protecting and preserving human
life must be assigned greater significance than protecting economic
integrity. Consequently, the court's resolution of the choice-of-law
problem is likely to turn on the determination of which state's interest in conduct regulation is the more significant. How should
the court go about making that determination?
I suppose the court could attempt to determine which state's
law, State A's law aimed at protecting and preserving human life
by deterring the marketing of defective products or State B's law
aimed at protecting and preserving human life by discouraging the
negligent use of products, is more likely to accomplish the desired
effect. There are, however, a couple of problems with attempting to
achieve such a determination. First, such an endeavor seems almost surely destined to turn into a judicial determination of which
state's local law is the "better rule of law." I am strongly inclined
toward the view that the "better rule of law" factor has no legitimate role to play in ingenuous interest analysis. 17 Its use seems
17. The last of the major theories is that propounded by Professor Robert Leflar
in a 1966 law review article, in which he undertook to capsulize those factors that had
influenced courts in their choice of law analyses. He articulated the following five
factors: (1) predictability of result, (2) maintenance of interstate and international
order, (3) simplification of the judicial task, (4) advancement of the forum's governmental interests and, by far the most controversial factor, (5) application of the better rule of law. The Leflar factors have proven to be exceedingly flexible in practice,
often allowing a court to apply a law which could not be selected under any other
modern theory, but which, for any number of reasons, might provide an appropriate
rule of decision in a particular case. Unfortunately, the theory is plagued by excessive
forum-favoritism. The third and fourth factors will almost never point to the application of foreign law. Moreover, the fifth factor also points to forum law in the great
majority of cases, since judge's rarely consider their state's own laws to be inferior to
those of another state. A final problem with the Leflar test is that the first three
factors are totally irrelevant in tort cases and tend to be ignored by judges. This
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almost invariably to lead to the parochial conclusion that "ours" is

the "better" rule of law.18 Second, absent significant empirical evidence, I'm not sure how a court could determine which state's law
was the more effective means of protecting and preserving human
life. And, even with such empirical evidence (should it exist), I believe that each state would have the right to make its own determination of what credibility to afford such data or which conflicting
studies (should they exist) to credit, and therefore each state
would have the right to make its own determination of which of
the two approaches was the more effective in accomplishing the
desired purpose. Consequently, with or without such empirical
data, the court's effort to determine which state's local law constituted the more efficient manner of protecting and preserving
human life would almost certainly degenerate into an inappropriate determination of the "better rule of law."
Is there some alternative manner of weighing the competing
state interests, each aimed at protecting and preserving human
life? I think there is. It's apparent that, if State A's law precluding
comparative negligence is applied, State B's interest in deterring
negligent product use would be wholly frustrated. On the other
hand, if State B's law permitting comparative negligence is applied, State A's interest in deterring the marketing of defective
products would not be wholly frustrated. While the ultimate sting
of liability imposed on the defendant would be diminished to the
extent that the plaintiff's negligent use of the product contributed
to his injuries, the net liability imposed on the defendant would
serve State A's interest to some extent. Since the application of
State A's law would wholly frustrate State B's interest in protecting and preserving human life by regulating the conduct of the
product user and the application of State B's law would only partially frustrate State A's interest in protecting and preserving
human life by regulating the conduct of the product marketer, I
believe the court should conclude that State B has the more significant interest in the application of its conduct regulating law. Of
course, the application of State B's law permitting the comparative
negligence defense and therefore potentially diminishing the plaintiff's recovery would necessarily enhance the possibility that the
further heightens the significance of the incredibly pro-forum fourth factor and the
highly subjective fifth factor. Several states, however, have found this system to their
liking.
Smith, 38 Hastings L J 1041, 1048-49 (cited in note 1) (footnotes omitted).
18. See note 17.
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injured plaintiff might become an indigent ward of State A. Should
that dissuade the State A court from applying State B's local law?
I think not. Even though we determined earlier that protecting the
plaintiff from indigence was of greater significance than protecting
the defendant from bankruptcy, each state's interest in protecting
and preserving human life through conduct regulation is manifestly more significant than each state's interest in protecting economic integrity. Therefore, that resolution affording the greater
play to the conduct regulating interests is the more appropriate
resolution. And, while that resolution may enhance the possibility
of the plaintiff's indigence, it does not compel that indigence. The
plaintiff will still enjoy some recovery and even that diminished
recovery serves as some, albeit limited, assurance against indigence. Consequently, I believe that the court should apply State
B's law permitting the comparative negligence defense and, therefore, deny the plaintiff's motion to strike that partial defense.
That resolution and the interest analysis by which it was accomplished suggest several conclusions with regard to an order of priority for competing underlying reasons of conflicting local laws.
First, an underlying reason aimed at preventing the indigence of
an injured person should be given priority over a competing underlying reason aimed at protecting economic integrity generally, because of the greater likelihood that such indigence will result given
an adverse choice-of-law result. Second, an underlying reason directed toward protecting and preserving human life through conduct regulation should be given priority over any interest in protecting economic integrity, simply because of the greater value
placed on human life. Third, confronted with competing interests
in protecting and preserving human life through conduct regulation, the court should attempt to achieve the result that does not
wholly frustrate such interest on the part of either state. By applying this order of priority to those competing interests, the court is
likely to achieve that choice-of-law result produced by the application of the local law of the state having the more significant interest in the application of its own law.
Something else emerges from the process we utilized in resolving
the above choice-of-law problem. Confronted with each state's interest in protecting the economic integrity of its domiciled litigant,
State A seeking to avoid the indigence of the injured person and
State B attempting to avoid the bankruptcy of the seller, we determined which of those interests was the more significant by asking
this question: Given an adverse choice-of-law result, which state's
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interest would be more frustrated? This question led us to conclude that, given an adverse result, the indigence of the injured
party would be more likely than the bankruptcy of the seller and
this conclusion, in turn, led us to the determination that, as between those two competing interests, State A's was the more significant. Confronted with each state's interest in protecting and
preserving human life through conduct regulation, State A seeking
to deter the marketing of defective products and State B attempting to deter the negligent use of such products, we determined
which of those interests was the more significant by asking the
same question: Given an adverse choice-of-law result, which state's
interest would be more frustrated? This question led us to conclude that, while the application of State A's law would wholly
frustrate State B's interest in conduct regulation, the application
of State B's law would frustrate State A's interest in conduct regulation only in part. This conclusion, in turn, led us to the determination that, as between those two competing interests, State B's
was the more significant. Given the primacy accorded to interests
aimed at protecting and preserving human life, we ultimately concluded that State B had the more significant interest in the application of its local law. That critical question-given an adverse
choice-of-law result, which state's interest would be more frustrated?-is the cornerstone of comparative impairment. And, as we
employed that question, it was at the core of determining which
state had the more significant interest in the application of its law.
This shouldn't be surprising. The question, after all, is simply another way of asking, which state has the more significant interest
in the application of its law to this issue in this case? Thus, comparative impairment, when applied directly and exclusively to the
interests in conflict, is an integral part of the process of interest
analysis in resolving a true conflict. By rephrasing the basic question from, Which state has the more significant interest in the application of its law?, to, Given an adverse choice-of-law result,
which state's interest would be more frustrated?, we simply provided the court with a specific perspective to be utilized in resolving the basic question. And that perspective, extremely helpful in
our hypothetical, is likely to be equally helpful in resolving any
true conflict. After all, the state whose interest will be more frustrated by an adverse choice-of-law result is likely to be the state
having the greater interest in the application of its own local law.
Thus, this use of comparative impairment, applied directly and exclusively to the conflicting interests, must assume a high priority
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among the various techniques available to an interest analysis
court confronted with a true conflict. The technique thus limited is
at the core of determining which state has the more significant interest in the application of its local law.
Let's fashion another hypothetical case. Plaintiff, domiciled in
State A, brings a medical malpractice action19 against defendant,
domiciled and practicing medicine in State B. The action is
brought in a State B court. Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount
of $5,000,000. Defendant moves that, in the event of an adverse
judgment, damages should not exceed $1,000,000. Defendant's motion is predicated on a State B statute imposing such a ceiling on
damages in medical malpractice actions." Plaintiff opposes the
motion, asserting that State A's law, which does not impose any
ceiling on damages in such actions, should be applied.
The court, using interest analysis, must first determine the reasons underlying each state's law. Let's begin with State B. What
are the reasons underlying that state's statutory ceiling? There
would appear to be two intimately related reasons. State B wishes
to: (1) protect the economic integrity of medical care providers in
that state, 21 (2) in order to assure the continuity of affordable medical care in that state.22 Since the defendant is a State B medical
care provider, the first reason converts into a significant interest on
the part of State B in having its statutory ceiling applied. Because
the defendant is a State B medical care provider, the second and
19. For a discussion of a series of choice-of-law problems likely to arise in medical

malpractice actions, see David E. Seidelson, Choice-of-Law Problems in Medical Malpractice Actions: Legislative Prescriptionsand Judicial Side Effects, 28 Duquesne L Rev 41
(1989).
20. See, for example, Va Code Ann § 8.01-581.15 (1990). In Etheridge v Medical
Center Hospitals, 237 Va 87, 376 SE2d 525 (1989), the court, dividing 4-3, held that the
Virginia ceiling violated neither the federal nor the state constitution.
21. See Etheridge, 376 SE2d at 527-28, 531.
The cap on ultimate liability [was] enacted into law by the State with the primary
purpose of protecting Virginia health care providers from excessive liability.
Kaiser-Georgetown Community Health Plan, Inc. v Stutsman, 491 A2d 502, 510 (DC Cir
1985).
22. Etheridge, 376 SE2d at 527-28, 531.
The statute may also have the effect of lessening malpractice premiums for health
care providers operating in Virginia. Thus, Virginia residents may be benefited incidentally by the Act in that the cost of medical malpractice insurance passed to them
though medical fees will be less than it would have been had the statute not been
enacted.
Kaiser-Georgetown Community Health Plan, Inc., 491 A2d at 510.
I would quarrel with the court's use of "incidentally." I believe that assuring the continuity of affordable health care was the primary reason for enactment of the statute. See
Seidelson, 28 Duquesne L Rev at 54 (cited in note 19).
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ultimate reason, too, converts into a significant interest on the part
of State B in having the ceiling applied. By limiting the extent of
liability imposed on State B medical care providers, that state
hopes to limit increases in professional liability insurance premiums charged medical care providers and thereby assure the continuity of affordable medical care in that state. Clearly, State B
has a significant interest in having its statutory ceiling applied to
this case.
What are the reasons underlying State A's common law, which
imposes no ceiling on recoveries in medical malpractice actions?
There would appear to be two reasons: (1) to assure that victims
domiciled in State A do not become indigent wards of that state, 23
and (2) to deter negligence through the imposition of unlimited
damages. 4 Because the plaintiff is domiciled in State A, the first
reason converts into a significant interest on the part of that state
in having its law applied. Should the plaintiff become indigent, it
is State A, his domicile, that will bear the primary burden of maintaining him. Does the second reason, conduct regulation aimed at
protecting and preserving human life, convert into a significant interest on the part of State A in having its law applied? The conduct intended to be regulated, the medical care, occurred in State
B and the immediate consequences of that conduct, the plaintiff's
injury, occurred in State B. However, because the plaintiff is domiciled in State A, the ongoing consequences of that conduct will be
felt in State A; therefore, the second reason for State A's law also
converts into a significant interest on the part of State A in having
its law applied. Once again, we are confronted with a true conflict.
Each state has a significant interest in the application of its own
23. In Kaiser-Georgetown Community Health Plan, Inc., 491 A2d at 510, the court
indicated that the District of Columbia's interest in protecting victims from indigence encompassed not only those domiciled in the District but those domiciled anywhere who
worked in the District. I think this unduly enlarges the class of persons intended to be
protected from indigence. See Seidelson, 28 Duquesne L Rev at 49 (cited in note 19).
24. Both defendants are corporate citizens of the District of Columbia. The District has a significant interest, reflected in the fact that it imposes no cap on liability
for malpractice, in holding its corporation liable for the full extent of the negligence
attributable to them.
Kaiser-Georgetown Community Health Plan, Inc., 491 A2d at 509-10.
I think the defendants being District of Columbia corporations was not an appropriate
basis for concluding that the District's concern with regulating conduct converted into a
significant interest on the part of the District in applying its no-ceiling law. Rather, I believe
the court should have determined where the conduct intended to be regulated occurred,
where the immediate consequences of that conduct occurred, and where the ongoing consequences of that conduct would be felt. See Seidelson, 28 Duquesne L Rev at 47 (cited in
note 19).
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local law.
The court must determine which state has the more significant
interest in the application of its law. Each state has an interest in
protecting the economic integrity of its litigant. State A wishes to
assure that its injured domiciliary does not become an indigent
ward of that state. If State B's interest in protecting the economic
integrity of its practitioner were no more than that, State A's economic concern rather clearly would be the more significant. After
all, the indigence of the injured person, deprived of his pre-existing
ability to be self-supporting, seems more likely than the indigence
of the physician, still physically able to be wholly self-supporting.
But State B's interest in the economic integrity of medical care
providers in that state does not exist simply to assure the existence
of wealthy, State B health care providers. Rather, State B wishes
to protect the economic integrity of those health care providers as
a means of assuring that they will continue to provide health care
within that state at affordable rates. This is the ultimate goal of
State B's law. Protecting the economic integrity of State B's health
care providers is simply one step in accomplishing the ultimate
purpose. In enacting the statutory ceiling, the State B legislature
was not motivated by a cynical desire to enrich its medical care
providers. Rather, its intent was the more benign one of assuring
the continued availability of medical care at affordable rates. It is
against this broader, underlying reason that State A's interest in
assuring that its domiciled victim does not become indigent must
be weighed.
Given an adverse choice-of-law result, how likely is it that the
injured person domiciled in State A will become an indigent ward
of that state? Bearing in mind that, even if State B's statutory
ceiling is applied, the plaintiff may recover damages up to
$1,000,000, his indigence seems rather unlikely, even taking into
account the contingent fee he will pay to counsel. On the other
hand, if the plaintiff is permitted an unlimited recovery, perhaps
as high as the $5,000,000 sought in the ad damnum clause, it does
seem likely that the defendant's professional liability carrier, compelled to pay that judgment, will increase the premium charged to
the defendant and perhaps to other State B practitioners and that
he and they will pass on that increased premium rate to their patients, thus frustrating State B's desire to assure the continuity of
affordable medical care. This would suggest that, as between State
A's interest in assuring that its domiciled victim does not become
an indigent ward and State B's interest in protecting the economic
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integrity of its medical care provider, thereby assuring the continuity of affordable medical care, the latter interest is the more
significant.
But how about the other reason for State A's law: to deter negligent care by the imposition of unlimited liability? Isn't that a conduct-regulating reason aimed at protecting and preserving human
life? Of course, and as such it should be given a high priority
among the reasons underlying each state's local law. We have already noted the unique value of human life. Does that mean that
State A should be deemed to have the more significant interest in
the application of its law? Not necessarily. The principal reason
underlying State B's local law, to assure the continuity of affordable medical care, is also aimed at protecting and preserving human
life. Presumably, the availability of affordable medical care will result in a greater number of those in need of medical care availing
themselves of that service. Thus, State B's statutory ceiling is entitled to a priority similar to that afforded State A's unlimited liability law since both are aimed at protecting and preserving human
life. Still, State A's law was directed toward protecting and preserving human life through conduct regulation, that is, by deterring negligent care. Isn't that deterrent purpose entitled to special
consideration? Perhaps. Yet, even if State B's statutory ceiling is
applied, State A's interest in deterrence will not be wholly frustrated. The imposition of damages up to the amount of $1,000,000
is likely to serve as a significant deterrent to negligent care. At the
same time, as we have already noted, permitting unlimited damages pursuant to State A's law is likely to frustrate significantly
State B's interest in assuring the continuity of affordable medical
care. Thus, interest analysis suggests that State B has the more
significant interest in the application of its local law.
Something else should be noted about State B's statutory ceiling: it is applicable only to medical malpractice actions.2 5 Thus, it
could be said that State B's local law is a sharply focused reaction
to what many (apparently including the State B legislature) have
characterized as the medical malpractice crisis. 2 How should that
25. In any verdict [or judgment] returned [or entered] against a health care provider in an action for malpractice . . . , the total amount recoverable for any injury
to, or death of, a patient shall not exceed one million dollars.
Va Code Ann § 8.01-581.15 (1990).
26. See note 3 and the language of the court in Tramontana v S. A. Empresa de
Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 350 F2d 468, 471 (DC Cir 1964), characterizing the sharply
focused concern manifested in the Brazilian law imposing a ceiling on damages only in per-
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sharply focused concern of State B influence the court confronted
with this true conflict? The fact that State B saw fit to impose a
ceiling on recovery only in medical malpractice actions suggests
that the state's interest is an intense one. This is not an across-theboard limitation on damages. 7 It applies only to a single activity:
the provision of medical care. Obviously, State B feels strongly
about protecting that single activity and, through that protection,
assuring the continuity of affordable medical care. That strong
feeling, that intense interest, should also influence the court toward the conclusion that State B has the more significant interest
in the application of its local law.
This is not to say that simply because State A's law not imposing such a ceiling is part of that state's common law-rather than a
legislative enactment-the court should give short shrift to that
law or its underlying reasons.2" On the contrary, the court should
be just as assiduous in identifying the reasons underlying State A's
common law as it is in discerning the reasons underlying State B's
ceiling statute. Were that not done, the court could be said to be
sending a message to the State A legislature to codify all of the
common law of that state. That would be to send the legislature on
a fool's errand. The enormity of the task would be overwhelming.
That very enormity might result in the legislature's overlooking
some portion of the state's common law. And, even assuming that
the legislature could cope with that overwhelming task and do so
without missing any part of the state's common law, the very act of
codification would be almost certain to raise a host of questions as
to whether the legislature had not changed the pre-existing law,
questions that might require generations of judicial opinions to resolve. No court should send that kind of message to any legislative
body. Thus, the court should not simply dismiss or diminish the
sonal injury a d wrongful death actions arising out of airplane accidents.
27.

See

ote 3.

28. [Plaintiff] contends that the District [of Columbia] government's silence on
the question of malpractice reform does not necessarily.

.

indicate a lack of interest

in the question, for it could equally well support an inference that the District wished
to assure its citizens the full remedies of traditional tort law. In the absence of further documentation of the District's putative interest, this argument remains specula-

tive. Even were we to give it full credence, however, we would conclude that Maryland is the jurisdiction with the stronger interest.
Bledsoe v Crowley, 849 F2d 639, 642 (DC Cir 1988) (footnotes omitted).

The court's grudging recognition of the "speculative" reasons underlying the District's
common law and that jurisdiction's "putative" interest are, in my opinion, inappropriate
and may even have led the court to overlook an underlying reason. See Seidelson, 28 Duquesne L Rev at 72 (cited in note 19).
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significance of State A's interest in the application of its law solely
because that law is a part of the state's common law, rather than a
statutory enactment. Still, the specificity of the State B statutory
ceiling continues to suggest a sharply focused and therefore a relatively intense interest on the part of State B. And the court, attempting to decide which state's interest in the application of its
own law is the more significant, can hardly avoid being sensitive to
the apparent intensity of interest manifested by State B's precisely
focused statute. That sensitivity is, I believe, entirely appropriate
and should induce the court toward concluding that State B's interest in the application of its ceiling law is more significant than
State A's interest in the application of its no-ceiling law. Therefore, the court should grant defendant's motion that, in the event
of an adverse judgment, damages should not exceed $1,000,000.
In resolving this choice-of-law problem, we utilized some of the
priorities fashioned in the first hypothetical case and fashioned
some additional ones. As in the first hypothetical, we concluded
that a state's interest in assuring that its injured domiciliary did
not become an indigent ward should be given priority over a competing state interest in protecting the economic integrity of its defendant. However, in this second hypothetical, we noted that State
B's interest in protecting the economic integrity of its medical care
providers was not an end in itself. Rather, it was an integral part
of that state's ultimate purpose of assuring the continuity of affordable medical care. Consequently, it became necessary to weigh
State A's interest in protecting the victim from indigence against
State B's ultimate purpose. Once again, comparative impairment
proved enormously helpful in this endeavor. By asking which
state's interest would be more impaired or frustrated by application of the other state's law, we concluded that State B's interest
in the application of its law was the more significant.
Once again, we found it appropriate to afford high priority to
State A's interest in protecting and preserving human life through
conduct regulation. At the same time, however, we determined that
State B's interest in assuring affordable medical care also served to
protect and preserve human life. The moral with regard to this second determination is apparent. The court should be sensitive to an
underlying reason directed toward protecting and preserving
human life not only with regard to those laws aimed at deterrence
through conduct regulation. Given the competing interests aimed
at protecting and preserving human life, State A's through conduct
regulation and State B's by assuring affordable medical care, con-
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parative impairment again proved determinative. Given an adverse
choice-of-law result, State B's interest would be more impaired or
frustrated than would State A's. And, finally, we concluded that a
court would and should be sensitive to the fact that one state's law
was sharply focused on the precise issue before the court, thereby
manifesting a relatively intense interest on the part of the state in
that issue. That final technique, I think, should be afforded a priority just below that given to comparative impairment. As we have
already noted, comparative impairment, applied directly and exclusively to the interests in conflict, is at the core of interest analysis. That one state's law manifests a sharply focused concern is not
quite at the core of interest analysis. It is, however, an important
element in weighing the significance of that state's interest. Thus,
its priority should be just beneath that afforded comparative
impairment.
Let's fashion another choice-of-law problem, one implicating an
underlying reason not involved in either of the first two hypotheticals. Defendant, domiciled in State A, there leaves his automobile
parked and unattended with the keys in the ignition. A thief steals
the car and, in the process of making his getaway, negligently
strikes and kills a child pedestrian in nearby State B, the child's
domicile. 29 At the time of the fatal impact, the child was crossing
the street holding on to the hand of her mother, the plaintiff, also
domiciled in State B. Plaintiff was not struck by the car. However,
as a result of witnessing the fatal impact, the plaintiff suffers severe emotional distress manifested by serious and specific psychological disorders. To recover for her injuries, plaintiff sues defendant in State A. Both State A and State B have a motor vehicle
code provision that makes it illegal to leave a parked vehicle unattended without removing the key.30 Moreover, both states hold the
neglectful parker civilly liable for personal injuries inflicted by the
negligent driving of the fleeing car thief.3 1 State A, however, holds
that no action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress unaccompanied by physical impact may be maintained.32 State B
29. This hypothetical was suggested by Gaither v Myers, 404 F2d 216 (DC Cir 1968).
30. See, for example, DC Traffic and Motor Vehicle Regulations, Art XIV, § 98
(1970); Md Trans Code Ann § 21-1101 (1977).
31.

See, for example, Ross v Hartman, 139 F2d 14 (DC Cir 1943).

32.

One interest which is still a subject of substantial controversy is that in free-

dom from mental disturbance. No general agreement has yet been reached on many
of the issues involving liability for negligence resulting in fright, shock, or other
mental or emotional harm, and any resulting physical consequences.

Keeton, ed, Prosser & Keeton on Torts at 359-60 (cited in note 6) (footnote omitted).
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permits such an action and would treat the present action as legally sufficient."3 Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff's action, asserting the applicability of State A's law. Plaintiff resists the motion, arguing that the court should apply State B's law.
The State A court, utilizing interest analysis, would be required
to identify the reasons underlying each state's local law. It determines that the basic reason underlying State A's law precluding
such actions is that state's concern with potentially fraudulent
claims. State A believes that claims based on emotional distress
absent impact are too easily feigned. This basic concern, in turn,
generates two related purposes: (1) State A wishes to protect the
economic integrity of defendants domiciled in that state who might
face liability in such potentially fraudulent actions, and (2) State A
desires to protect the integrity of the judicial process in that state
by assuring that its courts are not available as instruments for such
potentially fraudulent actions. 4 Because the defendant is domiciled in State A, the first reason converts into a significant interest
on the part of that state in having its law precluding such actions
applied. Because the action was brought in a State A court, the
second reason too converts into a significant interest on the part of
that state in having its law applied.
What is the reason underlying State B's law permitting such actions? State B believes that the victims of such severe emotional
distress are as vulnerable to resulting indigence as are the victims
of negligently inflicted impact injuries.15 Consequently, State B
For a case recently repudiating prior law withholding recognition from such a cause of
action, see Williams v Baker, 572 A2d 1062, 1064 (DC Cir 1990 en banc) (footnote omitted):
We hold that one may recover for emotional distress caused by witnessing injury to
an immediate family member ... if the claimant was in the zone of physical danger
and as a result feared for his or her own safety.
In Williams, however, the plaintiff-mother was denied a cause of action for severe emotional
distress occasioned by her child's illness allegedly caused by defendant-physician's negligent
treatment of the child because the mother had not been in the zone of physical danger.
33. See, for example, discussion of Williams in note 32.
34. There are at least three principal concerns. . . that continue to foster judicial
caution and doctrinal limitations on recovery for emotional distress: (1) the problem
of permitting legal redress for harm that is often temporary and relatively trivial; (2)
the danger that claims of mental harm will be falsified or imagined; and (3) the perceived unfairness of imposing heavy and disproportionate financial burdens upon a
defendant, whose conduct was only negligent, for consequences which appear remote
from the "wrongful" act . . . . Mental disturbance is easily simulated, and courts
which are plagued with fraudulent personal injury claims may be unwilling to open
the door to an even more dubious field.
Keeton, ed, Prosser & Keeton on Torts at 360-61 (cited in note 6) (footnote omitted).
35. Mental suffering is no more difficult to estimate in financial terms, and no less
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permits such actions to assure that psychologically injured parties
domiciled in that state do not become indigent wards. Because the
plaintiff is domiciled in State B, this reason converts into a significant interest on the part of that state in having its law applied.
Can it be said that State B's law also has a conduct regulating purpose, that is, that State B permits such actions for the purpose of
deterring negligent conduct? I find the assertion strained. Any potential defendant, aware that if his negligence results in impact injuries to another he will be liable for those injuries, may indeed be
motivated to act carefully to avoid such liability. To suggest that
the same actor will be further motivated to act carefully by the
prospect of liability for negligently inflicted emotional distress absent impact is not very persuasive. The suggestion imputes to the
actor the ability to anticipate that negligence on his part may result in emotional distress without impact to a potential victim. I
am inclined to believe that few if any actors possess such prescience, at least to the point where it will deter negligence beyond the
deterrence effected by potential liability for impact injuries and
their total consequences. Let's assume that the court arrives at the
same conclusion.
We are left then with this true conflict: State A has a significant
interest in the application of its law precluding such actions in order to protect the economic integrity of the defendant and to protect the integrity of the judicial process in that state. State B has a
significant interest in the application of its law permitting such actions to assure that the injured domiciliary does not become an
indigent ward of that state. Which state's interest in the application of its law is the more significant? If we weigh State A's interest in protecting the economic integrity of the defendant against
State B's interest in assuring that the injured domiciliary does not
become an indigent ward, we would conclude that the latter represents the more significant interest. Given an adverse choice-of-law
result, the indigence of the psychologically injured plaintiff seems
more likely to ensue than does the indigence of the defendant who
a real injury, than "physical" pain; it is not an independent intervening cause, but a
thing brought about by the defendant's negligence itself, and its consequences may
follow in unbroken sequence from that negligence; and while it may be true that its
consequences are seldom very serious unless there is some predisposing physical condition, the law is not for the protection of the physically sound alone. It is the business of the courts to make precedent where a wrong calls for redress, even if lawsuits
must be multiplied; and there has long been precedent enough, and no great increase
in litigation has been observed.
Id at 360.
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retains his pre-existing capacity to be self-supporting.
But how about State A's interest in protecting the integrity of
the judicial process in that state? I confess that attempting to determine an appropriate level of priority for a state's interest in protecting the integrity of its judicial process generally is especially
vexing to me. s" In large part, my difficulty arises out of the fact
that in some contexts the forum's interest in protecting the integrity of its judicial process is in law dependent on the defendant's
assertion of the forum law purportedly resting on that underlying
reason. If the defendant fails to assert that law, that is, if he waives
the defense, the defense falls and the court will entertain the action. In those circumstances, it becomes a little bit difficult to accept as a primary reason for that law a desire to protect the integrity of the judicial process. Therefore, protecting the economic
36. Apparently I am not alone in being troubled in attempting to determine the significance to attach to a state's interest in preserving the integrity of its judicial process. One
area in which this interest is likely to arise is that involving a choice-of-law problem as to
the applicable statute of limitations. See note 48 and accompanying text. In this context,
Professor Russell J. Weintraub has written:
A revision of the Restatement, Second, of Conflict of Laws, adopted after several
drafts and extensive debate, moves a halting step closer to a functional treatment of
statutes of limitations:
§ 142. Statute of Limitations
Whether a claim will be maintained against the defense of the statute of limitations in determined under the principles stated in § 6. In general, unless the
exceptional circumstances of the case make such a result unreasonable:
(1) The forum will apply its own statute of limitations barring the claim.
(2) The forum will apply its own statute of limitations permitting the claim
unless: (a) maintenance of the claim would serve no substantial interest of the
forum; and
(b) the claim would be barred under the statute of limitations of a state having
a more significant relationship to the parties and the occurrence.
The strong point of the provision is that subsection 2 would bring an end to forum
shopping for a long statute of limitations in a state that has jurisdiction over the
defendant but no other relationship to the parties or the transaction. The new section
is, however, far more forum-oriented than is justified if statutes of limitations receive
independent functional choice-of-law analysis.
Under section 1, a stale claim argument will almost invariably prevail when the
forum's statute of limitations is shorter. The forum should be willing to apply another
state's longer statute whenever the forum is not primarily concerned with affording
repose to the defendant and when, because of slight differences in forum and foreign
limitation periods, staleness of the claim does not threaten to compromise the forum's administration of justice.
Subsection 2 is also unduly favorable to forum interests, but now will affect the
merits. If limitations is given the same analysis as other issues, the forum interest in
recovery under its longer period will sometimes yield. This is especially likely if the
forum's limitations period is substantially longer than usual.
Russell Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws 12 (Foundation Press, 3d ed 1989
supp) (footnotes omitted).
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integrity of the domiciled defendant seems to be the primary purpose of the law, with the desire to protect the integrity of the judicial process becoming only a secondary consideration to be triggered only by the defendant's assertion of the law. On the other
hand, if, even absent defendant's assertion of the law, the court
could and would decline to entertain the action, then protecting
the integrity of the judicial process becomes a primary reason for
that law. Let's assume that, in our hypothetical, even if the defendant had failed to seek dismissal of the action, the court, once
aware that the plaintiff was seeking damages for the negligent infliction of emotional distress absent impact, would sua sponte dismiss the action. 37 In these circumstances, protecting the integrity
of the judicial process in State A by assuring that its courts are not
available as instruments for such potentially fraudulent claims
would be a basic reason underlying that state's law. How should
the court weigh this interest of State A against State B's interest
in assuring that the injured domiciliary does not become an indigent ward of that state?
It could be argued, I suppose, that, given the facts of this particular case, there seems little likelihood that the plaintiff's action is
fraudulent. Moreover, it could be asserted that the trial judge retains the usual judicial capacity to recognize and exclude any inherently incredible evidence and, ultimately, to determine legal
sufficiency based on the evidence admitted. In addition, it could be
maintained that the jury, the body usually charged with the responsibility for determining the credibility to be afforded to all
witnesses, would possess that typical capacity in this case. Consequently, the likelihood of a fraudulent action reaching the jury or
of the jury's finding for the plaintiff in a fraudulent action is significantly diminished, so that entertaining the action is not likely to
violate the integrity of State A's judicial process. Should the court
accept the argument? I think not. Underlying State A's refusal to
recognize such actions for the purpose of protecting the integrity of
the judicial process in that state, is a determination by that state
that judges and juries do not possess the capacity to discriminate
between legitimate and spurious actions based on negligently inflicted emotional distress absent impact. To impute such a capacity in this particular action would be completely at odds with the
37. I confess that I have been unable to find such a case. I indulged in the assumption stated in the text for the purpose of hypothesizing a state's interest in protecting the
integrity of its judicial process manifested in the strongest manner.
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underlying reason for State A's law. When the forum's law precludes recognition of a particular action, even absent the defendant's assertion of that law, because of the forum's concern with
fraudulent claims and the concomitant desire to protect the integrity of the judicial process in that state, the court should give significant weight to the underlying reason. Thus, even though State
B's interest in protecting the injured domiciliary from indigence
should be given priority over State A's interest in protecting the
economic integrity of the defendant, State A's interest in protecting the integrity of the judicial process in that state should enjoy
priority over State B's interest. Consequently, the court should
grant the defendant's motion to dismiss the action.
In resolving this choice-of-law problem we utilized anew an order
of priority fashioned in the earlier hypotheticals. We concluded
that one state's interest in protecting its injured domiciliary from
indigence should be given priority over the other state's interest in
protecting the economic integrity of its defendant. And, once
again, we achieved this order of priority by utilizing comparative
impairment and its conclusion that, given an adverse choice-of-law
result, the indigence of the injured plaintiff was more likely to result then the indigence of the intact defendant. We arrived at another conclusion in resolving this hypothetical: State B's law permitting such actions was not intended to protect and preserve
human life through conduct regulation. This negative conclusion
was critical, given the high order of priority afforded a state's interest in protecting and preserving human life. This high order of
priority necessarily suggests that the court should be circumspect
about accepting such an asserted interest where it seems unrealistic to impute such a purpose to a particular state's law. In one of
our earlier hypotheticals, we emphasized the importance of not
missing an interest in protecting and preserving human life (associated with a law intended to assure the continuity of affordable
medical care); our last hypothetical emphasizes the importance of
not accepting such an interest when such acceptance would be unrealistic. And, finally, our last hypothetical confronted us with a
state interest in protecting the integrity of the judicial process
within the forum state. Our conclusion was that such an interest,
in a case where the court would respond to such an interest irrespective of the defendant's invocation of the law, should be given
priority over a competing state interest in protecting the injured
plaintiff from indigence. This conclusion, in turn, suggests a further question.
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If the court in State A, once aware that plaintiff sought damages
for emotional distress absent impact, would dismiss the action sua
sponte, even if the defendant waived the defense, it would be clear
that protecting the integrity of the judicial process was indeed a
primary purpose of State A's law. But something else would become clear, too. Given this reaction on the part of the court-sua
sponte dismissal-State A's interest in protecting the integrity of
the judicial process in that state would necessarily achieve priority
over any competing state interest. Is this appropriate? In these circumstances, I suppose it is. If State A's law, aimed at protecting
the integrity of the judicial process within that state, would compel
dismissal, whether or not the defendant pleaded the law, State A
must feel very strongly that entertaining such an action would do
significant damage to the integrity of its judicial process, both in
terms of the court hearing the action and in terms of the broader
reputational interest that state has in its judicial process. Given
that specific damage and that broader loss of institutional repute
(as perceived by State A), the forum's interest in protecting the
integrity of its judicial process should prevail over any competing
state interest. This conclusion, in turn, argues strongly for great
circumspection on the part of the forum. It should find such an
overwhelming interest only in the most egregious case.
In our hypothetical, I assumed that the court in State A would
dismiss, whether or not the defendant requested dismissal. I made
the assumption to make a point. In an actual case, the court would
lack the luxury of assumption. It would be compelled to offer some
basis for the conclusion that sua sponte dismissal was appropriate
pursuant to the forum state's law. If that basis exists, the court
would, virtually of necessity, dismiss. Thus, in actuality, the forum's law would be given priority over any competing state interest. This priority would be justified, I think, by the forum's law
authorizing sua sponte dismissal. I can think of no more forceful
way for the forum to assert the intensity of its interest in protecting the integrity of the judicial process in that state.
Let's fashion another hypothetical case implicating a forum's interest in protecting the integrity of the judicial process. Plaintiff,
domiciled in State A, is seriously injured in a motor vehicle collision in State B. To recover for his injuries, plaintiff sues defendant, a State B domiciliary, in a federal district court sitting in
State B and exercising diversity jurisdiction.3 8 Plaintiff's injuries
38. I have placed the case in a diversity court in order to bring into play the second
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required that he spend several months at a rehabilitation center in
State A. At the time of his admission to the center, plaintiff was
interviewed by W, a psychologist employed by the center. The purpose of the interview was to reduce morbidity in the grouping of
people through their mental capacity.39 At trial, the liability issue
is hotly contested, plaintiff's evidence indicating that the collision
was the result of defendant's negligence and defendant's evidence
suggesting that plaintiff's neglect occasioned the collision. In the
defense's case, W is called to the stand. In response to plaintiff's
request for a side-bar offer of proof, defendant informs the court
that W will testify that, during the course of her interview with the
plaintiff, he assumed responsibility for the collision, stating that he
had lost control of his vehicle and had run into defendant's vehicle.
In addition, W will testify that this admission by plaintiff was pertinent to the purpose of the interview. Plaintiff objects to the offered testimony, asserting a psychologist-patient privilege statute
of State A that, in these circumstances, would preclude the psychologist from divulging any information disclosed by the patient
without the expressed consent of the patient.40 Defendant asserts
that State B recognizes no psychologist-patient privilege and that
its law should be applied.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 501, in a diversity case the
privilege of a person "shall be determined in accordance with State
law."4' 1 But which state's law applies-that of State A which recognizes the privilege or that of State B which does not? Since Samusentence of the Federal Rules of Evidence 501, which requires the court to resolve the privilege issue pursuant to state law and, given a choice-of-law problem as to which state's privilege law to apply, to resolve that choice-of-law problem as it would be resolved by the highest appellate court of the forum state. Samuelson v Susen, 576 F2d 546 (3d Cir 1978). Thus,
the court cannot avoid the choice-of-law problem by characterizing it as "procedural" and
automatically applying the forum's privilege law. Even if the action were brought in a state
court, I think it would be inappropriate for that court to avoid the choice-of-law problem by
indulging in a "procedural" characterization and automatically applying its own privilege
law. Such an approach would negate the substantive considerations underlying the privilege
law of either state.
Were we to assume simply that. . .[the] forum state would characterize the choiceof-law problem related to an evidentiary issue as "procedural" and automatically apply its own local law, we might . . . overstate the significance of the selection of
forum.
David E. Seidelson, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Discriminating Selection of
Forum, 23 Duquesne L Rev 559, 564 n 13 (1985). See also note 46.
39. The hypothetical case in the text is based on the facts of Elliott v Watkins
Trucking Co., 406 F2d 90 (7th Cir 1969).
40. See, for example; Ill Ann Stat ch 111, 5355 (Smith-Hurd 1990).
41. FRE 501.
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elson v Susen,'4 2 the answer has been clear. The diversity court
confronted with a choice-of-law problem as to which state's privilege law should apply, must resolve that problem precisely as it
would be resolved by the highest appellate court of the forum
state. When the diversity court looks to the opinions of the highest
appellate court of State B, it discovers that the appellate court has
embraced interest analysis but has not heretofore resolved this
particular choice-of-law problem. Therefore the diversity court, using interest analysis, must attempt to achieve the result it believes
would be achieved by the highest appellate court of State B.
What is the reason underlying State A's psychologist-patient
privilege statute? Apparently, State A wishes to encourage the patient to offer the psychologist complete candor, thereby permitting
the psychologist to arrive at the most accurate diagnosis possible
and afford the most appropriate treatment.43 Since the psychologist-patient relationship existed in State A, that state would have a
significant interest in the application of its privilege statute to this
case. Why does State B recognize no similar privilege? Apparently,
State B believes that the availability of such disclosures as evidence will protect the integrity of the judicial process in that
state." Does that reason convert into a significant interest on the
part of State B in having its law applied to this case being tried in
a diversity court in State B? I think the answer is yes, for a couple
of closely related reasons. First, if the case were being tried in a
state court in State B, the reason would clearly convert into a significant interest on the part of State B in having its law applied.
Thus, the court would be confronted with a true conflict and would
apply the law of that state having the more significant interest in
42. 576 F2d 546 (3d Cir 1978).
43. Rules of privilege are not without a rationale. Their warrant is the protection
of interests and relationships which, rightly or wrongly, are regarded as of sufficient
social importance to justify some sacrifice of availability of evidence relevant to the
administration of justice.
[A] substantial number operate to protect communications made within the context
of various professional relationships, e.g., attorney and client, physician and patient, clergyman and penitent. The rationale traditionally advanced for these privileges is that public policy requires the encouragement of the communications
without which these relationships cannot be effective.
Edward W. Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence 171 (West, 3d ed 1984) (footnote omitted).
44. The forum will almost invariably possess a strong interest in a correct determination of the facts in dispute before its courts, and therefore a strong interest in
the application of its rule[] [admitting the evidence].
Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence at 175 (cited in note 43).
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the application of its law. Were the diversity court to conclude that
the reason for State B's law did not convert into a significant interest, that court would have a false conflict and automatically apply
State A's law. That would be patently inconsistent with the mandate of Rule 501 and Samuelson. Second, the foundation of Samuelson is Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co."' In Klaxon, the Supreme Court held that a diversity court confronted with a choiceof-law problem must resolve it precisely as would the highest appellate court of the forum state. Were the diversity court to conclude that the reason underlying State B's law, which would convert into a significant interest on the part of State B if the action
were in a state court, did not convert into such a significant interest, once again the diversity court would have a false conflict and
automatically apply State A's law, while the state court would have
a true conflict and could apply State B's law. Hence, to be true to
Rule 501, Samuelson, and the Supreme Court's mandate in
Klaxon, the diversity court should conclude that State B's interest
in protecting the integrity of the judicial process in that state does
convert into a significant interest on the part of State B in having
its law applied. Once so concluding, of course, the court would be
confronted with a true conflict: State A has a significant interest in
having its privilege statute applied because the psychologist-patient relationship existed in that state and State B has a significant
interest in having its no-privilege law applied in order to protect
the integrity of the judicial process in that state. Which state's
in46
significant?
more
the
is
law
its
of
application
the
terest in
While State B's law rests on a desire to protect the integrity of
the judicial process, as did the forum's law in the preceding hypothetical, the two similar reasons appear distinguishable in degree.
In the preceding hypothetical, the forum's law completely pre45. 313 US 487 (1941).
46. Under traditional choice of law doctrine all rules of evidence, including those
of privilege, were viewed as procedural and thus appropriately supplied by the law of
the forum. This approach naturally tended to suppress any consideration of the differences in purpose clearly existing between rules of exclusion and preference on the
one hand, and rules of privilege on the other.
Modern conflict of law analysis, by contrast, inclines toward resolution of choice of
law questions through evaluation of the policy interests of the respective
jurisdictions.
In short, though case law to date is somewhat sparse, the basic difference in purpose between rules of privilege and other rules of evidence should prove of increasing significance in the resolution of choice of law problems.
Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence at 174-75 (cited in note 43).
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cluded actions for emotional distress absent impact because of that
state's determination that its courts and juries lacked the capacity
to distinguish between legitimate and spurious actions. In the present case, State B's law does not wholly preclude the action and it
is not based on a conclusive presumption of judicial incapacity.
Rather, State B's law is aimed at enhancing the reliability of judicial results in legally cognizable actions by assuring the availability
of a particular type of evidence. This still represents a significant
interest on the part of State B in having its law applied, of course;
but the interest may be less significant than one predicated on a
determined incapacity to distinguish legitimate from spurious
claims.
What, if anything, suggests that State A may have a more significant interest in the application of its law recognizing the privilege? To the extent that plaintiff relied on or contemplated the
application of any state's law at the time of his professional relationship with W, it was probably the law of State A, the state
where the relationship existed. To not apply that law, to compel W
to disclose the information given her by the plaintiff, would seem
to frustrate his reasonable expectations. Moreover, to the extent
that these expectations are frustrated, plaintiff and others who become parties to such relationships in State A may be dissuaded
from affording psychologists complete candor, thereby not only diminishing the efficacy of such relationships but conceivably destroying entirely the utility of such relationships within State A.
On the other hand, if State A's privilege statute is applied,
thereby vindicating the expectations of plaintiff and others who
are parties to such relationships in that state, the ability of the
diversity court in State B to resolve the liability issue will not be
wholly frustrated. The jury will have all the other admissible evidence on that point to consider. Its capacity to determine the issue
will not be eliminated; rather, that capacity will be only somewhat
diminished. And the adverse effect in State B will be limited to
this trial and other trials in which the same privilege issue may
arise. There will be no spill-over effect in State B as there might be
with regard to all such relationships in State A, were State B's law
applied. The adverse effect in State B then would be likely to occur in far fewer instances, were State A's privilege law applied.
Most such relationships are not likely to result in litigation. But
each such litigation would threaten all such relationships, were the
privilege not applied. Consequently, comparative impairment suggests that the application of State A's law would less frustrate
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State B's interest than would the application of State B's law frustrate the interest of State A. The diversity court in State B, therefore, should apply State A's privilege statute, sustain plaintiff's objection, and preclude W from testifying to the plaintiff's
admissions.
The results achieved in the last two hypotheticals suggest that
the relative significance of the forum's interest in the application
of its law aimed at protecting the integrity of the judicial process
may vary greatly depending on the nature of the specific law.
Where, as in the first of those two hypotheticals, the forum's law
would compel the court to dismiss the action sua sponte, the forum has manifested its interest in the strongest manner possible
and that interest perforce would demand an order of priority
higher than that of any state's competing interest. If, however, the
forum's interest is directed toward enhancing the integrity of its
judicial process by providing for the admissibility of certain evidence, the order of priority is substantially lower. Sufficiently
lower, in fact, that it should be subordinated to a competing state
interest directed toward regulating relationships within that other
state.
Let's fashion another hypothetical case involving a state interest
in protecting the integrity of its judicial process, this one perhaps
falling between the two preceding cases. Plaintiff, domiciled in
State A, brings a personal injury action against defendant, domiciled in State B, in a court sitting in State C, where defendant is
vulnerable to jurisdiction. The cause of action accrued in State D.
The action is initiated more than two but less than three years
after the cause accrued. The potentially applicable statutes of limitations of State A and State D are two years. The potentially applicable statutes of limitations of State B and State C are three
years. State C, the forum, has no "borrowing statute. ' 47 Defendant
moves to dismiss the action pursuant to the two-year statute of
State A, where the plaintiff is domiciled, or the two-year statute of
State D, where the cause of action accrued. Plaintiff resists the
47. Such a statute borrows a statute of limitations of another jurisdiction and
makes the foreign statute applicable at the forum. Typically, but not universally, the
statute borrowed is that of the state where the cause of action sued on "arose." Sometimes the borrowing statute contains an exception precluding its application against a
plaintiff who has been a resident of the forum and has held the cause of action since
it arose, but some borrowing statutes contain no exception for forum residents.
Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws at 58-59 (cited in note 36) (footnotes
omitted).
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motion to dismiss, asserting that the court should apply the threeyear statute of State B, defendant's domicile, or the three-year
statute of State C, the forum. State C has embraced interest analysis and uses that approach to resolve choice-of-law problems with
48
regard to statutes of limitation.
What are the reasons underlying each state's statute of limitations? Presumably, the same reasons exist for each of those statutes. One basic reason for a statute of limitations is to protect
against actions predicated on stale evidence. This basic reason, in
turn, suggests two concerns: (1) to protect the integrity of the judicial process by assuring that the courts of the state are not available as instruments for claims resting on stale evidence, and (2) to
protect the economic integrity of the defendant by assuring that he
will not face liability based on such stale evidence in a case where
the passage of time may have made it particularly difficult for him
to generate defensive evidence. e An additional underlying reason
for a statute of limitations is to afford the potential defendant a
period of repose, that is, to assure him that if he hasn't been sued
by a certain time he isn't going to be sued, at least not successfully;
thereby assuring that the potential defendant need not spend the
rest of his life under the threat of litigation. 50 Thus, each state's
statute rests on three concerns: (1) protecting the integrity of the
judicial process, (2) protecting the economic integrity of the defendant, and (3) affording the defendant a period of repose.
State A, the plaintiff's domicile, has no significant interest in
having its two-year statute applied to protect the integrity of its
judicial process. This action was brought in State C, thus no court
in State A is implicated. As the plaintiff's domicile (and not the
defendant's), State A has no significant interest in having its twoyear statute applied either to protect the economic integrity of the
defendant or to afford him a period of repose. State D, the place
where the claim accrued, has no significant interest in having its
two-year statute applied to protect the integrity of its judicial process since no State D court is involved. Also, State D has no signifi48. See, for example, id at 59 and cases cited therein.
49. Stale claims, the danger of mistake and fraud, the desire to protect a defendant from harassment after a decent interval-these were all matters in which Iowa [,
the state where the action arose,] could not properly wish its answers to the proper
balancing of parties' interests substituted for those of Missouri [, the common domicile of the litigants and the forum state].
Id at 63 (critical comment on Girth v Beaty Grocery Co., 407 SW2d 881 (Mo 1966) (foot-

notes omitted).
50. See note 49.
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cant interest in having its two-year statute applied either to protect the economic integrity of the defendant or to afford him a
period of repose since the defendant is not domiciled in State D.
State B, defendant's domicile, does have a significant interest in
having its statute applied both to protect the defendant's economic
integrity and to afford him a period of repose. However, since
State B has a three-year statute, its view must be that this action
does not improperly jeopardize either the defendant's economic integrity or his period of repose. State C, the forum, has a significant
interest in having its statute applied to protect the integrity of its
judicial process. However, since State C has a three-year statute,
its view must be that hearing this action will not jeopardize the
integrity of its judicial process. Interest analysis indicates that only
State B, the defendant's domicile, and State C, the forum, have a
significant interest in the application of their statutes of limitation.
Since each of those states has a three-year statute, the court need
not choose between them. Under either, the action was initiated in
a timely manner and defendant's motion to dismiss should be
denied."1
But let's tinker with our hypothetical. Let's retain a three-year
statute in State B, defendant's domicile, and impose a two-year
statute on State C, the forum. Now we have a true conflict. State
B's interest in protecting the defendant's economic integrity and in
affording him a period of repose continue to convert into a significant interest on the part of State B in having its statute applied.
However, because its statute is three years, the action would not be
time-barred. State C's interest in protecting the integrity of its judicial process continues to convert into a significant interest on the
part of State C in having its statute applied. Because State C's
statute is two years, it would bar the action. Confronted with this
true conflict, the court in State C would be required to determine
whether State B or State C has the more significant interest in the
application of its statute.
State B's interest in protecting the economic integrity of the defendant and in affording him a period of repose and the fact that
the action would be timely pursuant to State B's statute hardly
51. Apparently it would be constitutionally permissible for the forum qua forum to
apply its longer statute of limitations. Sun Oil Co. v Wortman, 486 US 717 (1988). Compare,
Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws at 10 (cited in note 36):
With the trend toward functional treatment of limitations, Sun Oil may prove to
have only short-term significance.
For extended comment on Sun Oil Co., see id at 91.
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requires elaboration. But how about State C's interest in protecting the integrity of its judicial process? How significant is that interest? I suppose the immediate answer might be very significant;
after all, the action is before a State C court and State C believes
that hearing this three-year-old action jeopardizes the integrity of
that state's judicial process. Let's indulge in the assumption, however, that, under State C's law, if the defendant fails to assert the
statute of limitations defense, he is deemed to have waived it; in
which case, the court would proceed to hear the action.2 This, it
seems to me, substantially diminishes State C's interest in protecting the integrity of its judicial process. It could be argued, I suppose, that the defendant will almost invariably assert the statute of
limitations defense, therefore the defendant is a dependable "surrogate" upon whom the state may rely to stimulate its interest in
protecting its judicial integrity. But I think the true significance of
State C's interest in protecting the integrity of its judicial process
can be determined only by inquiry into what the State C court
would do if defendant failed to assert the defense. If the answer to
this question is that the State C court would entertain the action,
State C itself has manifested a substantially diminished interest in
protecting its judicial process from state claims. Indeed, in those
circumstances, it would appear that the primary reasons underlying State C's statute of limitations are to protect the economic integrity of State C defendants and to afford those defendants a period of repose. Protecting the integrity of State C's judicial process
would seem to be no more than a secondary consequence of the
defendant's invocation of the statute of limitations defense. Consequently, State B's interest in protecting the economic integrity of
the State B defendant and affording him a period of repose would
seem to be a more significant interest than State C's secondary,
surrogate-initiated concern with protecting the integrity of its judicial process. Since State B has a three-year statute, its interest in
protecting the defendant from stale claims is not threatened by
this two-year-old cause of action. Therefore, the State C court
53
should deny the defendant's motion to dismiss.
In the immediately preceding hypotheticals, we have dealt with
52. This would appear to be the typical judicial reaction. See, for example, Charles A.
Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Wright & Miller on Federal Practiceand Procedure § 1278 n
11, § 1393 n 6 (West, 2d ed 1990 supp).

53. My resolution of this choice-of-law problem differs in approach from that of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts § 142 and with that of Professor Weintraub. See note 36
and Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Law at 56 (cited in note 36).
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three instances of a forum law having as one of its underlying reasons the protection of the integrity of the judicial process. In the
first case, the forum's law withheld recognition of actions to recover for negligently inflicted emotional distress absent impact. In
that case, we indulged in the assumption that the court, once cognizant of the nature of the action, would dismiss it sua sponte even
absent the defendant's motion. We concluded, indeed we were
compelled to conclude, that in those circumstances the forum's interest in protecting the integrity of its judicial process must be afforded priority over any competing state interest. This paramount
priority was compelled by the manner in which the forum's interest was manifested; a state's interest in protecting the integrity of
its judicial process could hardly be couched in a more emphatic
manner than where it compels sua sponte dismissal. In the last
hypothetical, involving a forum statute of limitations that would
bar the action, we determined the significance of the forum's interest in protecting the integrity of its judicial process by asking how
the forum would react to the time-barred action absent a motion
to dismiss. Indulging in the assumption that, in those circumstances, the forum would consider the defense waived and entertain the action, we concluded that the forum's interest in protecting the integrity of its judicial integrity was no more than a
secondary consequence of a defendant's motion to dismiss. It
seems to me that in any case in which the forum's interest in the
integrity of its judicial process is implicated because of the nature
or timeliness of the action, the most appropriate way to determine
the significance of that interest is by inquiry into how the forum
would react absent a motion to dismiss. If the forum would dismiss
sua sponte, its interest could not be more significant. If, on the
other hand, absent a motion to dismiss, the forum would entertain
the action, the interest in protecting the integrity of the judicial
process becomes insubstantial. In both instances, it is the forum
itself which manifests the significance or insignificance of that forum interest. In the intervening hypothetical, the forum's interest
in protecting the integrity of its judicial process was the reason underlying its non-recognition of a psychologist-patient privilege; the
forum believed that the availability of such evidence would enhance the validity of the forum's resolution of the action. In weighing the forum's interest against the competing state interest of encouraging patient candor in such a relationship, thereby enhancing
the efficacy of the relationship, comparative impairment indicated
that, given an adverse choice-of-law result, the latter interest
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would be more greatly impaired in terms of the patient's reasonable expectations and in terms of the quantity and quality of such
relationships that would be adversely affected. These approaches, I
believe, afford an appropriate method for determining the order of
priority of a forum's interest in protecting the integrity of its judicial process.
Let's fashion another hypothetical choice-of-law problem. Plaintiff, domiciled in State A, sues defendant, domiciled in State B, to
recover damages for loss of consortium sustained as a result of the
defendant's negligent driving which caused personal injuries to the
plaintiff's wife in State A. The action is brought in State B. State
A does not provide an action for loss of consortium.5 4 State B
does.55 Asserting the applicability of State A's law, defendant
moves to dismiss the action. Plaintiff resists the motion, arguing
that State B's law should be applied.
Why does State A decline to recognize an action for loss of consortium? Presumably, State A wishes to protect the economic integrity of its domiciled defendants by immunizing them from a
type of damages that State A finds to be superfluous, potentially
duplicative, or simply insufficiently critical to be afforded legal recognition.56 Because the defendant is domiciled in State B rather
than State A, the reason underlying State A's law would not convert into a significant interest on the part of that state in having
its law applied. Why does State B permit recovery for loss of consortium? One reason would be to protect the economic integrity of
the spouse of the immediate victim. By permitting such damages,
State B allows the spouse to realize compensation for the loss of
sex, services, and society sustained.5 7 It would be unrealistic to as54.

Virginia ...

has abrogated this common law right of action and does not per-

mit a husband to recover damages from a third party for loss of consortium due to
injuries negligently inflicted upon his wife. Va Code Ann § 55-36 (1986 Repl Vol).

Stutsman v Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 546 A2d 367, 372 (DC Cir 1988) (footnotes
omitted).
55. In the District of Columbia, a husband may seek damages for the loss of consortium sustained due to injuries negligently inflicted upon his wife.

Stutsman, 546 A2d at 372. For critical comment on the resolution of the choice-of-law problem in Stutsman, see Seidelson, 28 Duquesne L Rev at 57 (cited in note 19).
56. One of the chief problems in the consortium claim is the concern to avoid
duplicative or impermissible damage awards. So far as damages are based on intangible losses of society and affection, there is some risk that a jury hearing the husband's

claim will consciously or not, include something in the verdict for the wife's loss as
well, and vice versa.
Keeton, ed, Prosser & Keeton on Torts at 933 (cited in note 6).
57. Recovery in these cases initially emphasized a loss of "services," but it eventually became clear that the husband's recovery for loss of consortium, as it is called,
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sert that State B is interested in protecting the spouse from indigence. No matter how severe the loss of consortium may be, the
spouse of the immediate victim is unlikely to be reduced to indigence. Not having sustained any direct injuries, the spouse is likely
to retain his preexisting capacity to be self-supporting. Thus, this
reason for State B's law would be an interest in affording the
spouse domiciled in State B with a limited form of economic protection. Because the plaintiff is domiciled in State A, rather than
State B, he would seem not to be within the class intended to enjoy that limited economic protection. Therefore, this reason for
State B's law would not convert into a significant interest on the
part of that state in having its law applied. There may be another
reason for State B's law: preserving marriages of persons domiciled
in that state. State B may believe that the spouse who is denied
the sex, services, and society of the immediate victim may be less
likely to abandon the marriage if he has the opportunity to recover
damages for that denial." However, because the plaintiff and the
marriage to which he is a party are domiciled in State A, rather
than State B, that reason would not convert into a significant interest on the part of State B in having its law applied. Could it be
asserted that State B's law has a conduct regulating reason? I find
the assertion difficult to accept. I am willing to assume that a law
exposing the culpable actor to liability to the immediate victim of
that culpable action has a conduct regulating purpose. But it is
difficult for me to accept the assertion that liability for loss of consortium is also intended to have a conduct regulating effect. That
assertion suggests that a potential defendant, deterred from negligence by the prospect of liability to the immediate victim of such
negligence, will be further deterred by the prospect of additional
liability for loss of consortium sustained by the spouse of the immediate victim. Such an in terrorem effect seems to me to be painfully strained.5 9 Consequently, I would not attribute a conduct regulating reason to State B's law. And even if such a reason were to
be imputed, it would not convert into a significant interest on the
part of State B in having its law applied since the defendant's negligent conduct occurred in State A, the immediate consequences of
included damages for loss of sexual attentions, society, and affection . ...
Id at 931 (footnote omitted).
58. I confess that I have not seen this reason expressed in any judicial opinion. Nevertheless, it seems to me to be a rational reason for recognizing the cause of action.
59. For critical comment on a judicial implication that recognition of the action has a
conductregulating purpose, see Seidelson, 28 Duquesne L Rev at 62 (cited in note 19).
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that conduct occurred in State A, and the ongoing consequences of
that conduct will be felt in State A.60 Thus, we are left with a negative standoff: neither state has a significant interest in the application of its own law. What's a poor judge to do now?
What he should not do is throw up his hands in despair or fabricate some disingenuous reason to apply either state's law. Rather,
having determined that neither state has a significant interest in
the application of its own law, the court should drop down to a
lower level of interest and ask: Has either state a minimal interest
in the litigation and, if so, how is that minimal interest in the litigation best served? State A, the plaintiff's domicile, certainly has a
minimal interest in the litigation: protecting the economic integrity
of the plaintiff. Obviously, that minimal interest in the litigation
on the part of State A is best served by State B's law permitting an
action for loss of consortium. Neither the identification of that
minimal interest in the litigation on the part of State A nor the
application of State B's law to serve that minimal interest of State
A would generate any internal conflict on the part of State A. Because we have already determined that the reason for State A's law
precluding consortium actions, protecting the economic integrity of
State A defendants, does not convert into a significant interest on
the part of State A in having its law applied to this case in which
there is no State A defendant, application of State B's law to serve
State A's minimal interest in the litigation would frustrate no
other interest of State A. State B, the defendant's domicile, also
has a minimal interest in the litigation: protecting the economic
integrity of the defendant. Clearly, that minimal interest in the litigation on the part of State B is best served by State A's law precluding an action for loss of consortium. Neither the identification
of that minimal interest in the litigation on the part of State B nor
the application of State A's law to serve that minimal interest of
State B would generate any internal conflict on the part of State B.
Because we have already determined that neither reason for State
B's law permitting an action for loss of consortium, protecting the
economic integrity of a State B spouse and preserving marriages
domiciled in State B, converts into a significant interest on the
part of State B in having its law applied to this case, application of
60.

For critical comment on a judicial implication that such a conduct regulating pur-

pose converts into a significant interest on the part of the state where the defendant is

domiciled, irrespective of where the conduct occurred, where the immediate consequences of
the conduct occurred, and where the ongoing consequences of the conduct would be felt, see
id at 63.
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State A's law to serve State B's minimal interest in the litigation
would frustrate no other interest of State B. Consequently, each
state would have a minimal interest in the litigation best served by
the other state's law. What had been a negative standoff at the
level of each state's interest in the application of its own law has
been converted into a true conflict. State A has a minimal interest
in the litigation best served by the application of State B's law,
and State B has a minimal interest in the litigation best served by
the application of State A's law.
Now we must decide which state's minimal interest in the litigation is the more significant and then apply that law which will best
serve that interest. State A's minimal interest in protecting the economic integrity of its plaintiff is of limited concern. Even assuming an adverse choice-of-law result, one denying recovery for loss of
consortium, it is unlikely that the plaintiff would become an indigent ward of the state. After all, the plaintiff, having sustained no
direct injuries, is likely to retain his capacity to be self-supporting.
Similarly, State B's minimal interest in protecting the economic
integrity of its defendant is of limited concern. Even assuming an
adverse choice-of-law result, one permitting recovery for loss of
consortium, it is unlikely that such limited liability exposure would
result in the indigence of the defendant. Perhaps, in these circumstances, it would be helpful to ask this question: Which litigant
would have been in the better position to have acquired protective
insurance?"' The obvious answer would be the defendant. Any automobile liability insurance obtained by him would almost certainly have included an obligation on the part of the insurer to
defend and indemnify the insured with regard to damages for loss
of consortium. On the other hand, the plaintiff would have found it
difficult, if not impossible, to have acquired insurance protecting
61. See, for example, Bernard v Harrah's Club, 16 Cal 3d 313, 546 P2d 719, 725
(1976): "The imposition of. . . liability involves an increased economic exposure, which...
is a foreseeable and coverable business expense"; Offshore Rental Co. v Continental Oil Co.,
22 Cal 3d 157, 583 P2d 721, 727 (1978): "The fact that parties may reasonably be expected
to plan their transactions with insurance in mind may. . . constitute a relevant element in
the resolution of a true conflict"; Hall, 74 Cal App 3d 280, 286 (1977) (citation omitted):
The imposition of. . . liability. . . involves at most an increased economic exposure
which . . . is a foreseeable and coverable business expense . . . . Given the fact that
Nevada has chosen to engage in governmental and business activity in this state, the
necessary acquisition of additional insurance coverage to protect itself during such
activity is an entirely foreseeable and reasonable expense.
In Erwin v Thomas, 264 Or 454, 506 P2d 494 (1973) (en banc), the court, confronted with
an analogous negative standoff, arbitrarily decided to apply the forum's local law. I believe
that the method of resolution utilized in the text herein is the more rational approach.
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him from the loss of the sex, services, and society of his wife. Consequently, application of State B's law permitting recovery would
seem to frustrate State B's minimal interest in protecting the economic integrity of the defendant less than the application of State
A's law precluding recovery would frustrate State A's minimal interest in protecting the economic integrity of the plaintiff. Therefore, the court should conclude that State A's minimal interest in
the litigation is the more significant, apply State B's law which
best serves that minimal interest, and deny the defendant's motion
to dismiss the action.
Several points should be noted about the manner in which this
choice-of-law problem was resolved. First, and perhaps most notably, the fact that interest analysis demonstrated that neither state
had a significant interest in the application of its own law neither
stymied the court nor impelled it toward the fabrication of any
unrealistic reason underlying either state's law in order to evade
the negative standoff. Rather, the court candidly recognized the
existence of the negative standoff and proceeded to drop down to a
lower level of interest. Analysis at this reduced level of interest indicated that each state had a minimal interest in the litigation best
served by the other state's law. Thus, what had been a negative
standoff at the first level of interest was converted into a true conflict at the lower level of interest. This approach demonstrates that
no court should be overwhelmed by the prospect of a negative
standoff; virtually every such case is in reality a true conflict at the
lower level of interest indicated. Once the true conflict has been
identified, the court can use virtually any technique that would be
appropriate in resolving any true conflict for the purpose of determining which state's minimal interest in the litigation is the more
significant. And once that determination is achieved, the court
simply applies the law that best serves that more significant minimal interest: the law of the other state.
Second, once the true conflict at the lower level of interest was
identified, the court utilized comparative impairment just as it
might have done with any true conflict, and with only a minor adjustment of nomenclature to reflect the lower level of interest. The
court asked: Given an adverse choice-of-law result, which state's
(minimal) interest (in the litigation) would be more impaired?
This question generated an answer indicating that each state's interest in the economic integrity of its domiciled litigant was a limited one and neither state's limited interest was clearly superior.
Confronted with this set of rather evenly balanced competing in-
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terests, the court was compelled to go further in an effort to determine which state's minimal interest in the litigation was the more
significant.
It was this necessity that influenced the court toward the third
notable aspect of the opinion. The court utilized a broadened form
of comparative impairment. By asking which litigant would have
been in the better position to have acquired protective insurance, 62
the court was recasting the basic comparative impairment question
into this format: Given an adverse choice-of-law result, and taking
into account which litigant would have been in the better position
to have acquired protective insurance, which state's interest in protecting the economic integrity of its domiciled litigant would be
more impaired? The answer to this enlarged comparative impairment question virtually compelled the court toward the conclusion
that State A's interest in the economic integrity of its plaintiff was
the more significant. This enlarged format of the comparative impairment question is not limited in application to true conflicts at
the lower level of interest. A similar question could be utilized in
resolving a true conflict at the first level of interest, one in which
each state has a significant interest in the application of its own
law. However, some circumspection should be employed by the
court in utilizing the broadened question at either level. The narrower question that we had employed in the earlier hypotheticals
was focused directly and exclusively on the interests in conflict:
Given an adverse choice-of-law result, which state's interest would
be more impaired? The broadened form of the question incorporates an extrinsic consideration, the likelihood of each litigant having acquired protective insurance. Obviously, that likelihood is
somewhat speculative. Therefore, it seems appropriate for a court
to utilize this technique, the broadened format of comparative impairment, only in those cases in which the more precise form of
comparative impairment and the other techniques suggested earlier for resolving a true conflict fail to demonstrate where the more
significant interest lies. In other words, I think this technique
should be utilized only as a matter of necessity and placed at the
lowest order of priority of the available techniques.
Let's tinker with the facts of that last hypothetical. Plaintiff remains domiciled in State A and the defendant in State B. Let's
make State A the forum and State B the situs of the immediate
62.

See note 61.
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injury to the plaintiff's wife.6 And let's assume now that it is State

A's law that permits an action for loss of consortium and State B's
law that precludes such an action. Defendant, asserting the applicability of State B's law, moves to dismiss the action. Plaintiff resists the motion, arguing that State A's law should be applied.
In the preceding hypothetical, we identified two reasons underlying the law (now of State A) permitting an action for loss of consortium: (1) to protect the economic integrity of the spouse having
sustained the loss, and (2) to preserve marriages. Because the
plaintiff is domiciled in State A and because his marriage is there
domiciled, both of those underlying reasons for State A's law convert into significant interests on the part of that state in applying
its law to this case. Similarly, in the preceding hypothetical, we
identified the reason underlying the law (now of State B) precluding an action for loss of consortium: to protect the economic integrity of the defendant. Because the defendant is domiciled in State
B, this reason converts into a significant interest on the part of
that state in having its law applied to this case. The court is confronted with a true conflict at the first level of interest: each state
has a significant interest in the application of its own law. Which
state's interest in the application of its own law is the more significant? In this instance, the answer seems rather apparent. Even assuming that each state's interest in protecting the economic integrity of its domiciled litigant is roughly equivalent to the other
state's competing interest, State A's additional interest in preserving the marriage domiciled in that state would give State A the
more significant interest in having its law applied. That is not to
say that State A wins because it has two reasons to State B's one.
Interest analysis requires a qualitative, not quantitative, analysis.
But it is to say that, when one set of competing interests is pretty
much a wash, the state having an additional significant interest is
almost certain to have the more significant interest in the application of its local law. This is so apparent that it hardly requires
elaboration. And the hypothetical was so relatively easy to resolve
that it hardly provides much in the way of judicial guidance.
Let's make the choice-of-law problem more difficult. We can do
this by assuming that the State A court determines that there is
but one reason for that state's law permitting actions for loss of
63. I ask the reader to indulge in the assumption that the defendant would be vulnerable to jurisdiction in State A for the purpose of examining the choice-of-law problem generated by this tinkering with the facts of the preceding hypothetical.
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consortium: to protect the economic integrity of the spouse having
sustained such a loss. The State A court disavows the second reason, protecting the marriages of persons domiciled in that state.
Now the competing interests are considerably more evenly balanced. Each state has a significant interest in the application of its
own law to protect the economic integrity of its domiciled litigant.
At this point, counsel for the defendant informs the State A court
that the highest appellate court of State B retains the traditional
rule of lex loci delicti for resolving choice-of-law problems in tort
actions. Moreover, the State B court would characterize this consortium action as derivative,6 4 concluding that the last event necessary to give rise to the action was the negligent infliction of personal injuries on the wife in State B. Therefore, if this action were
before the State B court, that court would apply that state's law
precluding such actions. Counsel for the defendant argues that the
result achieved by State B's application of lex loci delicti reflects
an enhanced interest on the part of State B in having its local law
65
applied to this case.
Counsel for the plaintiff agrees that the highest appellate court
of State B retains lex loci delicti, having declined numerous legal
invitations to repudiate that traditional conflicts rule in favor of
some more analytical approach. The reason consistently given by
the highest appellate court of State B for that declination is its
preference for the ease of application and predictability of result
afforded by lex loci delicti. Counsel for the plaintiff argues that,
given the rationale stated by the State B court, that court has
manifested a preference for ease of applicability and predictability
of result over protecting State B's interests. By retaining lex loci
delicti, plaintiff's counsel asserts, State B has evidenced a diminished concern in protecting its interests, being willing to have those
interests vindicated or frustrated by the fortuitous situs of the injury."6 Therefore, plaintiff argues, State B has a diminished inter64.

A majority of jurisdictions characterize the consortium claim as being derivative.

A minority of jurisdictions characterize the claim as being independent. See, Keeton, ed,
Prosser & Keeton on Torts at 937-38 (cited in note 6).
65. Compare Tramontana, 350 F2d 468 (DC Cir 1965) (choice-of-law result that
would be achieved by court sitting in one of the interested states may enhance or diminish
that state's interest in having its local law applied).
66. Nor will Delaware apply its guest statute to an accident which occurs in a
common law jurisdiction. In Friday v Smoot, . . Delaware applied New Jersey law
allowing recovery for a host's negligence in an accident which occurred in New Jersey,
but involved a Delaware guest and host. Although the rationale for this choice of law
was the Court's refusal to abandon the rule of lex loci, the result of the decision is
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est in the application of its law to this case.
Which argument should the State A court credit? There is, I
suppose, an even more basic question to be addressed. Should the
State A court be influenced at all by the conflicts rule that would
be utilized by a State B court were the action before that court? At
one time, the conventional wisdom was that the forum should disregard the conflicts rule of another interested state and, indeed,
that general view continues to be espoused by some with certain
exceptions.6 7 This traditional view seems to have been fashioned,
at least in part, by a disfavoring view of renvoi.65 But in our hypothetical, neither counsel is arguing that State B's interest is overriding and therefore the State A court should put itself in the
shoes of the State B court and achieve whatever choice-of-law result that court would achieve.6 " Rather, both sides recognize that
the case presents a true conflict in which the competing interests
are rather evenly balanced. Defendant urges the State A court to
recognize the result that the State B court would achieve through
application of lex loci delicti, application of State B's local law, as
evidencing a somewhat enhanced interest on the part of State B in
that Delaware itself limits the scope of its policy and the protection it will give to its
resident-hosts. Clearly, if the accident involved in the instant case occurred at the
end of the trip in Pennsylvania, rather than in the middle of the trip in Delaware,
Delaware itself would apply Pennsylvania law and allow plaintiff to recover for the
negligence of his host.
Cipolla v Shaposka, 439 Pa 563, 267 A2d 854, 861 (Roberts dissenting).
67. There is one situation in which a forum that would opt for a functional analysis of conflicts problems should be guided by the territorial choice-of-law rule of other
states: when the forum is neutral, having no policy of its own to advance ....
There
is one other use for the renvoi device in a functional system of conflicts analysis.
There may be occasions when no rational basis for resolving a real conflict may be
available.
Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflicts of Laws at 70-71 (cited in note 36). Compare id at
12. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v G. C. Zarnas & Co., 304 Md 183, 498 A2d 605 (1985)
(decision to apply forum law confirmed because other state would also apply Maryland law,
citing Commentary).
In Bethlehem Steel Corp., the Maryland court, confronted with a choice-of-law problem
in a contract action, concluded that its conflicts rule of lex loci contractus which would have
referred to Pennsylvania local law had to yield to a strong public policy of Maryland which
invalidated the contractual provision at issue, an agreement to indemnify the promisee
against liability arising from the promisee's sole negligence. Therefore, the court applied
Maryland law invalidating the provision. In a footnote, the court indicated that a Pennsylvania court "applying significant contacts analysis" would also apply Maryland law. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 498 A2d at 609 n 5.
68. Professor Weintraub's comments set forth in note 67 appear under the heading of
"Renvoi."
69. This, I believe, is what renvoi would dictate. This is significantly different from
the technique discussed in the text.
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having its law applied to this case. Plaintiff argues that the conflicts rule utilized by State B, lex loci delicti, and the reason for
State B's retention of that rule, evidence a somewhat diminished
interest on the part of State B in having its law applied to this
70
case. There is some judicial authority for each argument.
My own view is that a court confronted with a true conflict in
which the competing interests are rather evenly balanced can gain
additional insight into the significance of each state's interest in
the application of its own law by examining the conflicts rule that
would be used or the result that would be achieved by that rule if
the case were laid before a court sitting in each of the interested
states. In our hypothetical, in which the forum is one of the two
interested states, the court can hardly look to the result it would
achieve. That's what the court is attempting to determine. But the
State A court can look to the conflicts rule that would be utilized
or the result that would be achieved by the court in State B, the
other interested state. In these circumstances, where the State B
court would utilize lex loci delicti, I think the result that would be
achieved by that court provides little or no additional insight into
the intensity of interest on the part of State B in having its law
applied to this case. After all, the only reason State B would apply
its own law is because the wife was injured in that state. Had the
wife been injured in State A, State B's lex loci delicti rule presumably would point to State A's local law. This suggests to me that
the State A court can gain additional insight into State B's interest
in having its law applied to this case by looking to that state's retention of lex loci delicti and the asserted reason for that retention.The stated rationale indicates that the highest appellate court
of State B prefers ease of applicability and predictability of result
even over protecting its own interests. Indeed, we have already
noted that the State B court, using lex loci delicti, would apply its
own local law protecting the economic integrity of its defendant
because the wife was injured in State B, but, had the wife been
injured in State A, the State B court, through lex loci delicti,
would apply State A's local law, thereby jeopardizing the economic
integrity of State B's defendant. Therefore, I believe that the State
A court should look to State B's retention of lex loci delicti and
the stated rationale for that retention, and from that retention and
rationale conclude that State B has manifested a somewhat diminished interest in the application of its local law to this case. Rela70.

See notes 65 and 66.
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tively, then, State A would have the more significant interest in the
application of its law to this case. Consequently, the State A court
should apply its law permitting the consortium action and deny
the defendant's motion to dismiss the action.
Suppose that when the State A court looks to the opinions of the
highest appellate court of State B it finds that that appellate court
has embraced interest analysis and, using that approach in a recent case involving a similar choice-of-law problem, concluded that
State A's interest in the application of its law permitting consortium actions was more significant than State B's interest in the
application of its law precluding such actions.7 1 How should the
State A court react to that opinion of the State B court? Obviously, the State B opinion would not be binding on the State A
court. Still, it would be persuasive evidence that State B's interest
in having its law applied, even in the view of that state's highest
appellate court, was less significant than the competing interest of
State A in the application of its law. In these circumstances, I believe that the State A court should look to the interest analysis
result achieved by State B and, from that result, find a diminished
interest on the part of State B and a relatively enhanced interest
on the part of State A; therefore, the State A court should apply
that state's law permitting the consortium action and deny defendant's motion to dismiss the action.
Suppose now that when the State A court looks to the opinions
of the highest appellate court of State B it finds that that appellate
court has embraced interest analysis and, using that approach in a
recent case involving a similar choice-of-law problem, concluded
that State B's interest in the application of its law precluding consortium actions was more significant than State A's interest in the
application of its law permitting such actions. 2 How should the
State A court react to that opinion of the State B court? Again, the
State B opinion would not be binding on the State A court. Still, it
would evidence a somewhat enhanced interest on the part of State
B in having its law applied in the instant case. At the same time, I
don't think the State B opinion should be read as creating a relatively diminished interest on the part of State A in having its law
71. I am assuming that in that opinion the State B court identified the same underlying reasons for each state's local law as did the State A court presently confronted with the
same choice-of-law problem.
72. I am assuming once again that the State B court identified the same underlying
reasons for each state's local law as did the State A court presently confronted with the
same choice-of-law problem.
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applied. It's one thing to say that a judicial recognition on the part
of State B that its interest is less significant than State A's should
generate a relatively enhanced interest on the part of State A. This
goes no further than acquiescing in a sister state court's obeisance
to State A's superior interest. It's something quite different to say
that a judicial determination by the State B court that its interest
is superior to State A's interest automatically results in a relatively
diminished interest on the part of State A. To say this would be to
abdicate to State B the judicial responsibility of State A to resolve
the choice-of-law problem. This doesn't mean that the State A
court should retaliate by a disingenuous determination that State
A's interest is more significant.7 3 Nor does it mean that the State A
court should ignore the State B determination. On the contrary,
the State A court should read the State B opinion as evidencing an
enhanced interest on the part of State B in having its law applied
to the present case and that enhanced interest should make it
more difficult for the State A court to find the State A interest
more significant. In short, the State A court should extend deference to the State B opinion without permitting that opinion to
preempt the State A court's obligation to resolve the choice-of-law
problem.
In resolving this final choice-of-law problem, we have utilized a
technique not employed in the preceding hypotheticals. Here we
had the forum influenced either by the conflicts rule of or the result achieved by the highest appellate court of the other interested
state. If the court of the other state retains lex loci delicti, preferring its ease of applicability and predictability of result even over
protecting that state's interests, the forum should look to this conflicts rule of the other state and infer from it a diminished interest
on the part of the other state and a relatively enhanced interest on
the part of the forum. If the court of the other state uses interest
analysis and through that methodology has determined that its interest is less significant than that of the present forum, the forum
should infer from this result a diminished interest on the part of
the other state and a relatively enhanced interest on the part of
the forum. If the court of the other state uses interest analysis and
through that methodology has determined that its interest is more
significant than that of the present forum, the forum should infer
from this result an enhanced interest on the part of the other state.
73. For critical comment on such an apparently retaliatory opinion, see Seidelson, 27
Duquesne L Rev at 106 (cited in note 1).
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What order of priority should be assigned to this technique? I believe it should be given priority over the broadened form of comparative impairment, taking into account the speculative conclusion as to which litigant would have been in a better position to
have acquired protective insurance, and below each of the other
techniques we employed that were aimed directly and intrinsically
at determining which state's interest was the more significant. Because of the necessarily speculative nature of this broadened form
of comparative impairment, it deserves utilization only when no
other technique provides the court with meaningful assistance in
determining which state has the more significant interest. Examination of the opinions of the highest appellate court of the other
interested state can, as we have seen, provide the forum with such
meaningful assistance. Still, such an examination of the judicial
opinions of the other interested state will necessarily involve either
a conflicts rule or a coloration on a conflicts rule that may differ
from that of the present forum. Consequently, the forum would do
well to defer being influenced by those other judicial opinions until
it has exhausted each of the other techniques available to it that
focus directly on determining which state has the more significant
interest and do so with the conflicts rule and coloration deemed
most appropriate by the forum.
CONCLUSION

In fashioning and resolving the choice-of-law problems in the
text, I have attempted to identify those underlying reasons for
state laws that are most likely to present competing state interests
in personal injury actions. I have also attempted to identify those
techniques most likely to be employed by an interest analysis court
in determining which state's interest is the more significant. I have
also attempted to assign an order of priority to each of those competing underlying reasons and for each of those techniques. In addition, I have suggested a method for dealing with those cases that
seemingly present a negative standoff, a method that would convert such cases into true conflicts. To the extent that my efforts
may be deemed successful, any court confronted with a true conflict in a personal injury action and, therefore, required to determine which state's interest is the more significant, will have available an order of priority among those competing interests and
among the techniques available to the court in determining which
state's interest is the more significant. Those two orders of priority
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should facilitate judicial performance of the most difficult aspects
of the choice-of-law process.

